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About the Building Futures Project 
The project which informs this report is entitled Building Futures: Aspirations of Syrian Youth Refugees and 
Host Population Responses in Lebanon, Greece and the UK. It runs from November 2016 to August 2018, 
and is supported by the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), a £1.5 billion fund announced by 
the UK government to encourage research which addresses challenges faced by developing countries. 
The funding is part of the budget for the Department for International Development and is administered 
through various UK-based funding bodies. Building Futures was part of a group of projects addressing 
the problems of forced displacement, funded jointly through the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) (award reference: ES/P005179/1). 
The Building Futures research project provides the most 
comprehensive assessment of the skills, training needs, work 
aspirations, lived experiences, and ethical perspectives of young Syrian 
forced migrants as they attempt to rebuild their lives in three host 
countries: a neighbouring host state (Lebanon), the main entry point 
to Europe (Greece), and a north European destination state (the 
United Kingdom - UK). It is also the first to offer a parallel exploration 
of the attitudes of host populations towards the displaced people in 
their midst in the respective countries. It is run by an interdisciplinary 
research team with expertise spanning economics, education and 
training, ethics, migration studies, political philosophy, political science, 
and sociology, and in cooperation with partners SolidarityNow 
(Greece), Educart –the Center for Educational Consultation and 
Research (Lebanon) and the Scottish Refugee Council (UK).  
The research findings are derived from face-to-face interviews with 1,516 Syrian international 
protection beneficiaries and applicants, aged between 18 and 32. The fieldwork was conducted in 
Lebanon (532 interviews), Greece (500 interviews) and the UK (484 interviews) between April and 
October 2017, by trained researchers and with the support of our partners. This first project report 
mainly focusses on this part of the fieldwork, exploring experiences, skills, training needs and work 
aspirations of young, forcibly displaced Syrians and their implications for policy.  
The second part of our fieldwork sought to capture the corresponding attitudes of citizens in the three 
host states, Lebanon, Greece and the UK. Representative surveys of home populations in the three 
countries, administered between October 2017 and April 2018, provided data on citizens’ aspirations 
and ideals, attitudes to refugees, and priorities for refugee policies. A full analysis of this part of the 
project is included in a final report, currently in preparation.  
Indeed, although this report is based on our survey with young refugees, the Building Futures project 
gives equal attention to the attitudes and preferences of citizens. Its overarching aim is to help 
overcome the perceived antagonism between the two groups, citizens and refugees, and promote 
consensus and cross-community understanding in a context of strained public resources and anti-
immigration sentiment. 
This policy report was prepared for dissemination at the Scottish Parliament Symposium: ‘Refugee 
Politics: Trade-Offs and Dilemmas’, 15 June 2018. If you would like to receive our final project report or 
for any further information about the project, the questionnaires used in the fieldwork, or its findings, 
please see www.RefugeePolitics.net or contact the Principal Investigator, Georgios Karyotis at 
georgios.karyotis@glasgow.ac.uk.   
How to cite: Karyotis, G., Colburn, B., Doyle, L., Hermannsson, K., Mulvey, G., and Skleparis, D. (2018) Building 
a New Life in Britain: The Skills, Experiences and Aspirations of Young Syrian Refugees, Building Futures Policy Report 
No 1, Glasgow: Policy Scotland. Available at www.RefugeePolitics.net and www.PolicyScotland.gla.ac.uk.     
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Executive Summary  
This report, the first of the project, presents original research evidence based on 1,516 face-to-face 
interviews with young Syrian international protection beneficiaries and applicants, 18-32 years old, 
which were conducted in the UK, Lebanon and Greece, between April and October 2017. Key findings 
from this comparative analysis inform our policy recommendations concerning the settlement, training 
and skills provision for young forced migrants in the UK.  
Key Findings: 
 Young Syrian refugees in the UK have the highest levels of skills and training, and are most eager 
to remain and contribute to the host country, compared with those in Greece and Lebanon. 
 Young Syrian refugees are faced with higher levels of unemployment in the UK than citizens, 
while many of them who are in employment are doing jobs for which they are over-qualified. 
 Refugees in the UK receive better support and have an overall more positive experience and 
evaluation of actors compared to those in Greece and Lebanon, but access to key provisions 
designed to enhance labour market participation remains patchy.  
 Syrian refugees who have been resettled to the UK report overall more positive experiences 
than those coming through the asylum route, despite higher levels of employment among the 
latter and the government supposedly taking the more vulnerable among the former. 
 Young Syrians in Scotland are better supported, and more positive about their engagement with 
people and institutions, although they are currently more distanced from re-integration into the 
labour market compared to those settled in England.  
Our key policy recommendations, derived from these findings, are: 
A. Policy makers and influencers should communicate much clearer to the general public both why 
refugees flee their country, as well as what contributions they are able and eager to make once 
they reach the United Kingdom.   
B. The UK government should invest in the education and training of young refugees, prioritising 
access to entry-level ESOL courses. Assistance in reconstructing people’s educational records, 
or in providing recognition of previous qualifications/accreditation, would help remove a key 
factor explaining the significant under-utilisation of high skills in the refugee workforce. 
C. There is a need for authorities at all levels to concentrate time and resources to encourage, 
facilitate and coordinate the provision of services designed to improve refugees’ understanding 
of how the labour market and job application process work in the UK. The private sector should 
engage with this population as a potential workforce, recognising and utilising their skills. 
D. The existing two-tier refugee support system, based on the mode of entry to the UK, produces 
inequalities in the experiences of and support for young Syrians. All refugees should have the 
same social provisions to support their integration, based on the refugee resettlement model.  
E. If the aim of refugee policy is to facilitate settlement, rather than forced self-reliance, then the 
support offered to refugees in Scotland should be emulated across the UK, to confront the 
inequalities of the current system. Alternatively, providing the Scottish Parliament with greater 
jurisdiction concerning the welfare and settlement of those forcibly displaced would bring clear 
benefits for those settled in Scotland. 
The UK is signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which commits its parties to granting 
international protection to persons with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. While it is clear 
from our findings that Syrian refugees are both well-educated and skilled, it is not these 
characteristics, but the conditions that force people flee, that make a refugee a refugee. A system 
that creates multiple and arbitrary tiers of support to vulnerable and equally deserving populations 
does not only undermine its effectiveness but also potentially clashes with the country’s 
international legal obligations.  
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Introduction  
Since the onset of the civil war in 2011, it is estimated that more than 12 million Syrians have been 
forced to flee their homes ‘making Syria the largest displacement crisis globally’.1 Of these, the majority 
have been internally displaced by violence, while more than 5.6 million have registered as refugees, 
mostly in neighbouring countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan, and more recently in 
Europe, where over a million asylum applications had been lodged by April 2016. The crisis has not 
only reversed all twelve Millennium Development Goals indicators for Syria, including a contraction of 
its national economy by 40% and a decrease of life expectancy by over 20 years, it has also undermined, 
to varying degrees, stability and social cohesion in receiving states that often lack the required 
resources, the political and public will, or both, to support those in desperate need.2 
Our case studies capture three different arenas for this ongoing crisis: a neighbouring host state 
(Lebanon), the main entry point to Europe (Greece), and a north European destination state (the UK). 
Despite its small size, population (4.5 million) and limited resources, Lebanon is a host to more than 1 
million registered Syrian refugees. This has led to lower incomes and a reduction of job opportunities, 
including for Lebanese workers. In response, international reports have highlighted the importance of 
skills training and job creation for both refugees and host workers alike.3 Greece has since 2010 been 
experiencing a deep economic crisis, relying on external bailouts and facing a 26% unemployment rate, 
which jumps to over 50% for those under 25 years old, three times the EU average.4 Despite these 
dire economic conditions, Greece is one of the main transit country of refugees to Europe, via Turkey. 
In 2015-2016, about a million arrived through that route, and many became trapped in Greece, more 
than half of them Syrians, with limited access to their preferred destination countries in Northern 
Europe after the adoption of more restrictive policies across Europe.5 Our third case, the UK, 
represents one of the preferred destination countries for Syrian refugees.6 While its national economy 
is much stronger than the other two cases, it has seen persistent criticism of the adequacy of vocational 
education and training for young adults7, and anti-immigration attitudes have been suggested as a key 
factor in the victory of the ‘Leave’ campaign on the EU Referendum in June 2016.8 In all three cases, 
therefore, there are significant social, political and economic challenges involved in meeting the needs 
of refugees, while doing justice to the claims of the host population, many of whom may be analogously 
disadvantaged themselves.  
The immediate priorities of the international community have naturally been to address the refugees’ 
safety and basic needs, such as health care, water, sanitation, food security and shelter. The protracted 
nature of the Syrian conflict, however, has also directed attention to other areas.9 Foremost amongst 
                                            
1 OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2016) ‘Syrian Arab Republic’, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p. 1. Accessed 12th July 2018 http://www.unocha.org/syria. 
2 OCHA (2016) ‘Syrian Arab Republic’. 
3 ILO (International Labour Organisation) (2014) Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their 
Employment Profile 2013. Beirut: International Labour Organisation Regional Office for Arab States. Accessed 12th July 
2018. https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_240134/lang--en/index.htm.   
4 Eurostat (2016) Unemployment statistics Eurostat Statistics Explained. Accessed 12th July 2018. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics.  
5 Skleparis, D. (2017) European Governments’ Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Southeastern Europe, 41(3), 276-301. 
6 A survey of 637 forced migrants conducted in March 2016 in Athens found that Germany was by far their top preferred 
destination (68%), followed by Sweden (5.8%), the UK (4.5%), France (4.1%) and the Netherlands (3.4%). See Kapa Research 
(2016) ‘Erevna se Prosfiges’ (Face to Face), 16-17 March, 2016. Accessed 12 July 2018. https://bit.ly/2JAVaUF.  
7 Sainsbury, D. (2016) Report of the Independent Panel on Technical Education. London: Gatsby Foundation. Accessed 12th 
July 2018. http://www.gatsby.org.uk/uploads/education/reports/pdf/report-of-the-independent-panel-on-technical-
education.pdf.  
8 Goodwin, M., & Milazzo, C. (2017) Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3), 450-464. 
9 World Bank (2015) Our New Strategy. Accessed 12th July 2018. http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/our-
new-strategy. 
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these are policies designed to empower refugees to integrate socially and economically in host 
societies, at least temporarily, while the ‘push factors’ that forced them to leave their country still 
persist.10 Education and skills development is at the heart of these efforts, but the focus has primarily 
been on the 1.4 million Syrian refugee children in neighbouring host states, half of whom are not in 
school, with far less academic and policy attention on young adults.11  
The Building Futures project addresses this gap, focussing on a demographic - young refugees, 18 to 32 
years old - whose personal development and educational needs are markedly different to the formal 
curriculum provisions that apply to children, and whose skills are key to economic prosperity.12 
Education, after all, says Aristotle is ‘an ornament in prosperity and a refuge in adversity’; a number of 
academic studies, as well as NGOs, emphasise this in their policy recommendations for managing the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis.13 
In what follows, we discuss a set of key research findings that have to do with young Syrian forced 
migrants’ existing skills, demographic characteristics and own perspectives on the opportunities and 
barriers they face in meeting their aspirations. We compare these findings about young Syrian forced 
migrants across three countries (Lebanon, Greece and the UK). We also explore how these findings 
vary within the UK (England and Scotland), and between different modes of access to the country 
(‘Asylum’ and ‘Resettlement’ routes). In each case, we link these research findings to key policy 
recommendations, and along the way, we highlight instances where our findings debunk prevalent myths 
about forced migrants in the UK. 
  
                                            
10 Gibney, M. (2014) ‘Political Theory, Ethics, and Forced Migration’ in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, and N. 
Sigona (eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
11 Deane, S. (2016) Syria's Lost Generation: Refugee Education Provision and Societal Security in an Ongoing Conflict 
Emergency. In M. Tadros and J. Selby (eds) Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond, Institute of Development 
Studies Bulletin 47(3), 35-52.  
12 In this policy report, unless otherwise specified, we use the term ‘refugee’ signifying persons who have fled armed conflict 
or persecution. This does not necessarily mean that they have been legally recognised as such by their host states. Indeed, 
our sample includes 83% legally recognised refugees in the UK, and 12% in Greece. Lebanon, as a non-signatory party of 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 or its 1967 Protocol, has not adopted any domestic legislation 
specifically addressing the status of refugees, which is presently determined mainly by the provisions of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) signed between Lebanon and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 
our Lebanon sample, 46% fall into this category. In the UK, which is the main focus of this report, our sample also includes 
6% asylum seekers, 3% under temporary protection, and 8% under the ‘Other’ category (e.g. student visa). 
13 See, for example, Global Migration Group (2016) Acting together in a world on the move. Accessed 12th July 2018.  
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/.  
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1. Young Syrian refugees in the UK possess high skills and are eager to contribute 
Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, Syria was recognised as having one of the most advanced 
educational systems in the region, with almost universal completion of primary school and a secondary 
school completion rate of 74 percent. Our sampled young Syrians in Greece, Lebanon and the UK are 
similar in terms of broad demographic features such as age (18-32 years old), gender and family 
circumstances (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Demographic profile of young refugees in Lebanon, Greece and the UK (%) 
However, our findings suggest that there is a significant sorting of refugees between host countries, on 
the basis of skills and qualifications, that is, there are clear patterns as to where refugees end up. Young 
Syrian refugees in the UK have the highest levels of skills and training, and are most eager to remain 
and contribute to the host country, compared with those in Greece or Lebanon. This is in line with 
established understanding of migration patterns, where migration is selective and individuals with higher 
economic potential (e.g. who are young, well-educated) tend to be more mobile. 
This pattern is evident in Figure 2 below. The majority (47.6%) of respondents in Lebanon have 
elementary or primary education as their highest qualification. By contrast, 22.4% and only 12.4% of 
Syrians in Greece and the UK respectively reported elementary or primary education as their highest 
qualification. The samples are more or less similar when comparing numbers of respondents who have 
intermediate qualifications. However, the UK sample contained disproportionately more respondents 
with higher qualifications: 25.7% reported an undergraduate or higher degree as their highest 
qualification, compared to only 8.8% in Lebanon and 15.4% in Greece.  
This sorting is only a general tendency in our sample. We must recognise that there are many highly 
qualified young Syrians residing both in Lebanon and Greece, and that many young Syrian refugees in 
the UK possess less than secondary education (40.2%). Indeed, one also has to take into consideration 
those who didn’t manage to complete their education due to the war in their home country: 22.4% in 
Lebanon, 46.4% in Greece, and 41.3% in the UK. Yet, overall, the statistics do clearly show that, on 
average, young Syrian refugees in the UK tend to be more highly qualified than their counterparts in 
Lebanon and Greece. 
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Figure 2: Highest qualification attained by refugees in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
We also asked respondents about the skills they have used in work or private life across five domains: 
language, numeracy, literacy, computer use, and soft skills. Young Syrian refugees in all three countries 
exhibit competency in a variety of hard and soft skills, many at an advanced level.  
 
Figure 3: Comparative numeracy, literacy, writing and I.T skills of young Syrian refugees (%) 
On average, however, those in the UK tend to be more skilled across the board (see Figure 3). Looking 
at each of those indicators in isolation paints a picture of a tendency towards sorting on ability of Syrian 
refugees, with the more skilled tending to migrate further away. The picture that emerges is complex, 
but the overall tendency is that respondents in the UK report higher skills.  
Our statistical analysis of these results indicates that general demographic variables (e.g. age, gender, 
marital status) are not significant when it comes to identifying the probability of young Syrian refugees 
being in the UK, rather than in Lebanon or Greece. Yet, qualification variables are highly so: possessing 
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only a primary qualification makes an individual four times less likely to be in the UK, but possessing a 
secondary or tertiary qualification makes someone about two times more likely to be in the UK 
compared to those with intermediate qualifications. Evidently, and contrary to public perceptions, there 
are many highly qualified young Syrian refugees in the UK, more so than other countries. 
 
Figure 4: Employment status in Syria and aspired employment status in the UK (%) 
Another persistent public concern is the perception that refugees come to the UK for employment 
and welfare opportunities, rather than to find refuge. Our findings, here and elsewhere, challenge this 
assumption as well. According to our survey, the vast majority of young Syrian refugees in our UK 
sample were either studying (38%) or in employment (45%) six months before they were forced to 
leave their country. Still, and despite the fact that only 2% of young Syrians were unemployed before 
leaving their home, media and political frames – often and problematically – portray them as economic 
migrants, not forcibly displaced ones. 
Similarly, the vast majority of those who have now settled in the UK aspire to complete their studies 
(31%) or be in employment (57%), as Figure 4 shows. Interestingly, it appears that while 13% were 
homemakers six months before leaving Syria, a role exclusively reserved to women in our sample, only 
4% aspire to be homemakers in the UK. Finally, only 3% of our survey participants are not currently 
seeking employment, mostly because they are unable to work due to disability, trauma or other 
vulnerability. Overall, these results emphatically demonstrate that young Syrians in the UK are not only 
able – given their high skills and qualifications – but are also particularly eager to make a positive 
contribution to the economy and society of their host state. Publicising such findings may help reduce 
public anxieties over the economic impact of forced migration in host countries.  
Policy recommendation A.  
Syrian refugees in the UK are highly educated and many have experience of skilled employment. It is 
incumbent on all levels of government to empower them to apply these skills in the host society. 
Policy makers and influencers, including the media and civil society, should communicate much 
clearer to the general public both why refugees flee their country, as well as what contributions they 
are able and eager to make once they reach the United Kingdom.  
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2. Young Syrian refugees are active in the UK labour market but face significant barriers 
in fully utilising their skills and education  
We also asked young Syrians about their current employment status in the UK. A substantial 
proportion are either studying (36%) or in paid employment (26.8%). Of the others, some are 
homemakers (14.1%), unable to work or not seeking employment (total 3.2%). But a substantial 
minority are unemployed and looking for work: 19.1% of young refugees in our sample, nearly five 
times the current general UK unemployment rate (4.1% in January 2018). If we add those who are 
underemployed (in the sense that they have less work than they would like), the total is 28.5%.  
  
Figure 5: Current employment status of Syrian refugees in the UK 
Our data also reveals underemployment of Syrian refugees in another sense. Even amongst those Syrian 
refugees who are employed, there is a tendency for people to be working in jobs which do not make 
full use of the experience from their previous employment in Syria. Figure 6 presents a comparison of 
the type of work our respondents had six months before leaving Syria, compared to their current job 
in the UK. 
  
  Figure 6: Comparison of past job type in Syria vis a vis current job in the UK 
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In some cases, we can see that Syrian refugees have found employment which matches their past 
experience: for example – and always remembering that these statistics are limited to those who are 
presently in work in the UK – 80% of Syrians who had been working in sales or services found the 
same kind of employment here. In other cases, however, a significant proportion have ended up in jobs 
that tend to require lower skills and qualifications, and less experience. For example: 
 Of those who were doing professional or highly technical work six months before leaving Syria, 
only a little over half (57.1%) have found similar work here: others have taken semi-skilled or 
unskilled manual work (10.7%), managerial or senior administrative work (7.1%), clerical work 
(3.6%), or work in sales and services (7.1%). 
 Of those who were doing skilled manual work six months before leaving Syria, 60.9% are doing 
similar work now. Some have shifted to clerical work (4.3%) or have become small business 
owners (8.7%), but many have ended up in semi-skilled or unskilled manual work (13%) or other 
types of work not covered by our categories (4.3%). 
 Exactly half of those who were foremen or supervisors of other workers six months before 
leaving Syria are being utilised in similar roles now. The rest are all now in semi-skilled or 
unskilled manual labour. 
 Further analysis by sector indicates other patterns; for example, service sector workers 
(including the care and health sectors) are tending to work in the same field as before. This is 
consistent with existing evidence that indicate that refugees with experience of care work are 
more likely to find employment in this sector.  
The overall picture that emerges is that young Syrian refugees are faced with higher levels of 
unemployment in the UK than citizens, but many of them who are in employment are doing jobs for 
which they are over-qualified. Our attention then needs to turn to identifying the drivers of this 
underuse of Syrian refugees’ skills and experience.  
To understand their employment prospects, we asked young Syrian refugees to report the main factors 
preventing them from getting a job. Results for the UK are plotted in Table 1.  
 Named as 
1st factor 
Named as 
2nd factor 
Named as 
3rd factor 
Total 
Language 54.4 4.0 3.8 62.2 
Lack of work experience in the UK 5.0 12.5 23.8 41.3 
Lack of experience in applying for jobs  3.8 15.2 7.9 26.7 
Lack of connections/contacts 1.0 5.0 13.3 19.3 
Lack of recognition of overseas qualifications 7.4 8.9 2.9 19.2 
Lack of computer skills 2.9 10.2 2.9 16.0 
Irrelevance of my past education and work 2.4 9.6 3.8 15.0 
Lack of training opportunities 4.5 6.6 4.6 15.7 
Lack of knowledge/familiarity with labour market  1.9 4.0 7.9 13.8 
Lack of references / documentation .5 3.3 7.1 10.9 
Lack of career counselling 2.6 5.6 2.1 10.3 
Not knowing how to search for job vacancies .2 5.0 4.2 9.4 
Lack of resources (e.g. expenses, childcare etc.) 1.0 3.0 5.0 9.0 
Experience of racism/discrimination .7 1.7 5.0 7.4 
Lack of legal access to employment 1.4 4.0 1.3 6.7 
Being a refugee .2 1.3 3.3 4.8 
Table 1: Factors preventing young Syrian refugees securing a job in the UK (%) 
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Young Syrians in the UK perceive language to be the biggest obstacle to labour market participation. 
More than half in our survey (54.4%) named it as the first factor preventing them from securing a job. 
In total, 62.2% of valid responses put language as one of the top three barriers they faced, which chimes 
with findings elsewhere that new refugees need intense and upfront language learning. Long waiting 
lists, particularly at the entry level of English to Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) courses, were 
specifically identified as a pressing issue. Other significant factors included lack of work experience in 
the UK (41.3%, of whom 5% mentioned it as the most important factor) and lack of experience with 
applications and interviews (26.7%, and mentioned as the most important factor by 3.8%).  
The top entries in Table 1 point to language training and help with adapting to the UK employment 
market as the key factors that would address Syrian refugees’ perceived barriers. It is worth noting, 
therefore, that beyond language – which is what one might have expected – many of these impediments 
are things that are likely to affect UK citizens as well, particularly young people (e.g. lack of experience 
and familiarity with labour market processes). This suggests that many challenges are not ‘refugee-
specific’, but instead shared by anyone trying to get a foothold in the labour market, and that it might 
therefore be effective to design policies built on this common ground. 
One further factor worth highlighting here – which does seem to be refugee-specific – is the problem 
of how to prove and recognise Syrians’ previous qualifications. When asked about their experiences in 
the UK, only 7.2% mentioned that their past qualifications had been converted or recognised in the 
UK. Moreover, nearly a third of young Syrians cited ‘lack of recognition of overseas qualifications’ 
(19.2%) and lack of references or documentation concerning their qualifications (10.9%) as one of the 
top three barriers for them. This is a problem most likely to affect the professional and skilled 
individuals, whose experience is most under-used. It is therefore an obvious priority, even if its 
elimination is unlikely by itself, to ameliorate all the problems discussed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy recommendation B. 
Investing in the education and training of young refugees, which was forcibly interrupted by the 
conflict, is paramount. A continued focus on improving English language provisions, eliminating long 
waiting lists particularly at the entry level of English to Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) courses, 
will remove a key barrier to work for Syrian refugees, though on its own will not address 
unemployment and underemployment.  
Further priorities should be helping young Syrians to get work experience (e.g. through work 
placements, apprentices, support with setting up own businesses) and familiarity with the processes 
of applying for jobs, obstacles to labour market entry that are shared with young British citizens. 
Providing alternative accreditation of past qualifications and skills with minimal bureaucracy will help 
remove a key factor explaining the significant under-utilisation of high skills in the Syrian workforce. 
A possible model of skills auditing can be found at the ‘UK National Recognition Information Service’ 
or the ‘European Qualifications Passport for Refugees’. 
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3. The UK provides better support and a less hostile environment than other countries 
While refugees everywhere face some hostile attitudes, Syrian refugees in the UK report less overt 
discrimination than those in Lebanon or Greece. Our study asked young Syrian refugees about their 
experiences in all three countries. The headline figures suggest that refugee experiences are much less 
negative in the UK than they are elsewhere.  
Figure 7 plots the percent of respondents who reported having suffered each of the following 
experiences of overt discrimination. While Syrian refugees still suffer from some negative experiences, 
especially being insulted and harassed (7.2%), the overall numbers of structural discrimination by 
business or state/NGO institutions, and of physical violence and oppression are low, and considerably 
lower than the corresponding figures for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Greece. 
 
Figure 7: Negative experiences of young Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
Moreover, Syrian refugees in the UK are more likely to have benefited from key provisions since their 
arrival, compared to those in Lebanon and Greece. As Figure 8 shows, there are national differences in 
the ways that refugees have been supported, including the balance of support between government 
bodies and employers. But, overall, the figures for the UK tend to be either somewhat or significantly 
more positive than in either of the other two study countries.  
Nevertheless, there are some points of concern. For one thing, these overall figures indicate significant 
gaps, which relate directly to the barriers to labour market access, discussed earlier. First of all, given 
the importance of language training in overcoming barriers to employment, it is regrettable that 34.7% 
of Syrian refugees in the UK did not access English language courses, with women in particular being 
less likely to have benefitted. Of grave concern is also the very low percentage of young Syrians, 7.2% 
in the UK, who have received support in having their overseas qualifications recognised. This provides 
further impetus for the need to implement flexible and efficient schemes for auditing and accrediting 
the skills and qualifications of refugees, as noted above. 
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In addition, there is scope for enhancing provisions in relation to other key barriers. Increasing the 
proportion of refugees taking part in volunteering or work placements in the UK (currently 25.8%), 
could help alleviate the second biggest barrier to the labour market. Our results indicate that there is 
further scope for provisions that empower refugees to realise their employment aspirations. The key 
priorities here concern the low proportion of refugees that have experienced training provision by job 
centres (9.5%), career counselling (6.2%) or employer-led recruitment events (3.5%). Young Syrian 
refugees in the UK are also about three times less likely to benefit from training provision by employers, 
compared to those in Lebanon. Any initiative, from the private or public sector, that helps refugees 
familiarise themselves with and navigate through the UK labour market would significantly enhance 
their employment prospects and increase their confidence with application and interview processes.  
 
Figure 8: Provisions young Syrians have benefited from in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
Young Syrians in the UK are also more likely to positively evaluate the key actors and institutions they 
encountered since their forced displacement, compared to those in Lebanon or Greece.  
Figure 9: Positive Evaluations of key actors in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
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Figure 9 shows the percentages reporting positive evaluations for a range of key actors in each country. 
Those in the UK are more positive, in particular, about the role of national government and local 
authorities. In part, this reflects the more prominent role played by public authorities in the UK, by 
contrast with Greece and Lebanon; but it also suggests that this role is often played successfully. One 
actor more positively evaluated in Lebanon, compared to the UK, is employers, who, as noted, play a 
more active role in providing training provisions, and in some cases other support (e.g. housing), to 
refugees there. 
Finally, we asked survey participants to select up to four emotions -from a list of ten- that best capture 
their feelings about their current situation in each of the three host countries studied. Results are 
plotted in Figure 10 and are consistent with earlier findings. While Syrian refugees in the UK mostly 
feel hopeful (55%), happy (40.3%) and grateful (25.4%), those in Lebanon and Greece experience much 
more anxiety, sadness, desperation and fear.  
 
Figure 10: Emotions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
 
 
 
 
Policy recommendation C. 
While we shouldn't be complacent, it is worth publicising good news about the experience of Syrian 
refugees in the UK, which is more positive than for those in Lebanon and Greece.  
Still, only a small minority of Syrians in the UK have received support in key areas of labour market 
access. There is a need for authorities at all levels to concentrate time and resources to encourage, 
facilitate and coordinate the provision of these services, particularly in relation to improving 
refugees’ understanding of how the labour market and job application process work in the UK.  
The private sector should engage with the Syrian refugee population as a potential workforce, 
recognising and utilising their skills. 
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4. Resettled Syrian refugees are better supported than those coming through the asylum 
system 
So far, we have been dealing with aggregated figures for all Syrian refugees in the UK. Our data also 
allows us to compare the experiences of young refugees based on their mode of entry to the UK. The 
two ‘types’ of Syrian refugees who arrive in the UK are those who are resettled (Resettlement Route – 
RR) and those who find their own way to Britain and apply for asylum (Asylum Route – AR). In our 
sample, 39% (189 respondents) had been granted refugee status through the resettlement route, and 
42% (202 respondents) through the asylum route.  
The former apply via the United Nations Refugee Agency from neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, 
to which they have fled from Syria. In 2015, the UK Government, after significant public pressure, 
agreed to resettle 20,000 by 2020, as part of the Syrian Vulnerable Person’s Resettlement Scheme 
(VPRS), a scheme targeting the most vulnerable of Syrian forced migrants. Local authorities take the 
lead on resettling specific individuals and groups, who are then supported by the aid budget for the first 
year through Council-Home Office agreements that provides specific resources for each resettled 
person. On the other hand, those who arrive by their own means to the UK must apply for asylum 
and traverse the asylum process, meaning that they are subject to no choice dispersal around the UK 
and are housed and supported by the Home Office while in the asylum process. On being recognised 
as refugees, there are no dedicated statutory resources available to aid their settlement.14  
In the year ending March 2018, the number of applications from Syrian nationals fell 42% compared 
with the previous year (from 1,074 to 619), a fall consistent with the previous two years. Over the 
same period, there was a fall in both the number of Syrian nationals granted asylum (down 54%) and a 
20% decrease in the number of Syrian nationals being granted protection in the UK through other 
means, such as the VPRS (from 5,453 to 4,342).15  
 
Figure 11: Educational qualifications among Asylum and Resettlement route refugees 
While we have already discussed the sorting of refugees between our three study countries on the 
basis of skills and qualifications, a similar effect also exists between these two modes of entry. To begin 
                                            
14 See National Audit Office (2016) The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement. Accessed 12 July 2018. 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-Syrian-Vulnerable-Persons-Resettlement-programme.pdf. It 
should be noted that prior to 2011, the UK Government had funded dedicated casework support to newly-recognised 
refugees in the UK to assist in their integration through the Refugee Integration and Employment Service. Since 2011, all 
newly-recognised refugees in Scotland continue to be offered integration advice and support by the Scottish Refugee 
Council. See: Mulvey, G. (2015). Refugee integration policy: the effects of UK policy-making on refugees in Scotland. Journal 
of Social Policy, 44(2), 357-375; Strang, A., Baillot, H., and Mignard, E.. (2016) Rights, Resilience & Refugee Integration in 
Scotland: New Scots and the Holistic Integration Service. Scottish Refugee Council. 
15 See Gov.UK (2018) ‘National Statistics: How many people do we grant asylum or protection to?’. Published 24 May 2018. 
Accessed 12 July 2018.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-year-ending-march-2018/how-
many-people-do-we-grant-asylum-or-protection-to.  
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with there are differences in the ‘attributes’ that Syrians have. As Figure 11 shows, the mode of access 
to the UK has educational dimensions, with AR refugees much more likely to have higher education 
qualifications compared to RR refugees, 34% against 10%.  
This is also reflected in employment biographies. In the six months prior to leaving Syria, significantly 
more AR refugees were in some form of salaried employment, 52% compared to a figure of 36% for 
RR refugees. While some of this variation can be explained by the high number of ‘homemakers’ among 
RR refugees, 21% against 6% for AR refugees, this is only a partial explanation, with other factors also 
playing a role. The most important of these is the link between the educational levels of participants 
and the UK Government making a specific point of resettling more vulnerable Syrians. There is a likely 
symbiosis between vulnerability, trauma and worklessness.  
Looking ahead, re-integration into the education system, as noted, is one of the main aspirations of 
many young Syrians, with one out of three stating that they wished to be able to study in the UK (31%). 
A major challenge towards this direction, however, seems to be the lack of formal documentation, 
particularly among AR refugees (61%), compared to RR refugees (31%). Mode of access therefore also 
impacts upon educational prospects.  
Furthermore, for RR refugees, access to the labour market is, in principle, open from the minute they 
arrive in the UK, though significant barriers to such access remain. By contrast, those who follow the 
asylum route have, in practice, no access to the labour market while waiting for decisions on their 
applications, and are left to fend for themselves once they are granted protection.  
Still, 42% of AR refugees were in some form of employment when they completed our survey, 
compared to just 9% among RR refugees (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Employment status among Asylum and Resettlement route refugees  
While this may seem paradoxical, it is possible that this is explained by the extra time afforded to RR 
refugees to learn English and attend educational courses without the immediate need to generate their 
own income. Such support is not equally available to AR refugees, who have generally had less access 
to English language provision or education. An additional explanation may be the higher skill levels of 
AR refugees, alongside the ‘vulnerability’ of RR refugees. Taken together it should not be surprising 
that RR refugees are further away from labour market participation.  
Moreover, the positive and negative experiences differ between the two groups. RR refugees were 
more likely to have benefited from two of the social welfare provisions we have identified as being key 
to overcoming barriers to employment: provision of English language courses (84% of RR refugees but 
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62% of AR refugees had benefited from these), and provision of cultural awareness training courses 
(24% of RR refugees and 10% of AR refugees). It is also worth adding that language provision is built 
into resettlement funding, so even the 84% appears low.  
Turning to the role of key actors, RR refugees have been exposed to more multi-agency support than 
those coming through the asylum route and are predictably more positive about the support they have 
received from them. RR refugees speak more positively of Local Authorities; International 
Organisations; and National Civil Society/NGOs. Interesting though, they also speak more positively of 
the British population, suggesting perhaps that minus the hostile anti-asylum environment and a need 
to prove their ‘legitimacy’ as refugees, Syrians are able to live relatively free of overt hostility. By 
contrast, AR refugees have more positive evaluations of employers only (see Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13: Positive evaluations of key actors among Asylum and Resettlement route refugees  
RR refugees also have a more positive overall outlook on social cohesion and relations compared to 
entrants through the asylum route: they were consistently more eager to respond ‘not at all’ when 
asked about the extent to which factors caused divisions between Syrians and UK citizens (e.g. 
availability of employment opportunities, education, training, or resources; cultural differences; 
historical animosity; and religious differences).  
This all suggests that there is a more supportive environment for RR refugees than for those who have 
gone through the asylum system. Taking this a step further, it also seems that there is a more general 
sense that there is less tension for RR refugees, perhaps due to the fact that, unlike AR refugees, they 
do not have to prove who they are and why they are here.  
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All of these findings can be encapsulated in two more general findings that, at least in part, emanate 
from the help and support that RR refugees receive in comparison with AR refugees. RR respondents 
are happier, more confident, and more hopeful than those coming through the asylum route despite, 
for example, higher levels of employment among the latter and the UK Government supposedly taking 
the more vulnerable among the former. 
Perhaps of even more significance is the young refugees’ reported future plans. While 70% of Syrian 
refugees who come through the asylum route plan to remain in the UK, the figure for those resettled 
is 83%. This is at the very least indicative of what may seem like an obvious point, that where people 
feel treated well and are supported, they will tend to settle better.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy recommendation D.  
Having access to social provision and no need to prove their right to be in the country has a positive 
impact on how refugees experience their lives. This suggests the need for policy to provide more 
social goods, taking more seriously universal provision, and overcoming the ‘culture of disbelief’ with 
regard to the asylum process. 
The existing two-tier refugee system produces inequalities in the experience and support available 
to young Syrians, based on their mode of entry to the UK. All refugees should have the same social 
provisions to support their integration, and this should be modelled on the refugee resettlement 
model.  
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5. Refugees in Scotland settle better than those in England 
Beyond differences in terms of the mode of entry to the UK, we also find some significant differences 
between refugees in Scotland and those in England. In our sample, 44% (212 respondents) of young 
Syrian refugees have settled in England and 55% (265 respondents) have settled in Scotland. To begin 
with, we observe differences in the levels of skills of young Syrian refugees in England compared to 
those in Scotland (see Figure 14). While the latter are more likely than the former to only have 
completed intermediary education (18.5% in England against 35.1% in Scotland), more than a third of 
those in England have a Higher Education degree.  
 
Figure 14: Educational Qualifications of young Syrians in England and Scotland 
Moreover, young Syrian refugees in England are slightly more likely to have documentation that shows 
their qualifications. In both countries, those who came through the asylum route are more likely to 
have such documentation. However, the largest differences are observed in the resettled population. 
In Scotland, 77% of RR refugees possess no documentation about their qualifications, compared to 49% 
in England. This suggests that young Syrian refugees in Scotland may be further away from re-integration 
into the education system and the labour market compared to those in England. Indeed, as shown in 
Figure 15, refugees in Scotland are less likely to be in employment than those in England (20.4% against 
35.5%). This may partly to do with the higher numbers of RR refugees in our Scottish sample who, as 
discussed in the previous section, demonstrate lower levels of labour market participation.  
 
Figure 15: Employment Status of young Syrians in England and Scotland 
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Our data also reveals that language is perceived by young Syrians as the main obstacle in meeting their 
future employment aspirations, more so in Scotland than in England (67% against 56%). Yet, at the same 
time, as Figure 16 plots, refugees in Scotland report higher levels of access to English language provision 
than those in England (74% against 54%), among both RR and AR refugees. Therefore, the fact that 
those in Scotland are less likely to be in work should arguably not be viewed as a permanent state. 
Those being facilitated to pursue education as well as with greater access to language support in 
Scotland may well be in the position in the near future to access employment opportunities that better 
match their skills, qualifications and experiences. To this end, it is also important to be further 
supported with relevant provisions that address the other main barriers that refugees face in getting a 
foothold in the labour market, previously shown in Table 1. 
 
Figure 16: Provisions young Syrians have benefited from in England and Scotland 
In all, young Syrians who have settled in Scotland are much better supported compared to those in 
England. 72% of our respondents in Scotland reported that their accommodation rent is subsidised by 
the state, compared to only 46% of those in England. Along the same lines, state cash subsidies 
constituted the main source of income for 70% of young Syrians in Scotland, compared to 47% of those 
in England. Taken together, these result in far better living conditions for those in Scotland, with, for 
example, only 11% living in shared accommodation, compared to 28% in England. Less state support to 
young Syrian refugees in England pushes them to faster labour market integration than those in 
Scotland, as self-reliance is adopted as a survival mechanism. Yet, this not only exposes them to more 
precarious employment conditions, as discussed, but also impacts upon their emotional state.  
Young Syrians in England are more confident than those in Scotland (32% compared to 19%) but also 
more anxious (27% compared to 22%) and scared (14% compared to 9%) about their life in the UK. 
Moreover, young Syrians appear to be much happier in Scotland than in England (49% against 30%). 
These emotions feed directly into young Syrians’ plans for their future in the UK, with 81% of those in 
Scotland intending to remain in the country, compared to 65% of those in England. 
Finally, turning to the role of key actors, the more positive experiences among those in Scotland with 
a number of actors is also testament to a greater sense of social support (see Figure 17). In our sample 
in Scotland, 79% of refugees positively evaluated the national government, compared to 66% in England, 
although what constitutes the national in the Scottish case is not necessarily clear. Looking at another 
tier of government produces an even starker outcome, with 82% in Scotland and 60% in England 
providing a positive evaluation of Local Authorities. Indeed, a full range of actors are viewed more 
positively in Scotland than in England, civil society organisations (58% against 49%), the Syrian 
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community (87% against 66%) and international organisations (50% against 34%). However, what is 
perhaps most striking in these results, is the evaluation of the general population. In England, 60% of 
Syrian refugees rate the population positively, compared to 89% for those who have settled in Scotland.  
  
Figure 17: Positive evaluations of key actors in England and Scotland 
 
A plausible explanation for this difference may be found in contextual factors, with the existence of a 
national policy of refugee integration in Scotland but not currently in England, and the overall less anti-
immigration narrative in Scotland, especially in terms of political leadership and the media, impacting 
on how refugees perceive the general population, and vice versa.16 
 
Policy recommendation E.  
Young Syrian refugees in Scotland are better supported, and more positive about their engagement 
with people and institutions, although they are currently more distanced from re-integration into the 
labour market compared to those settled in England.  
If the aim of refugee policy is to facilitate settlement, rather than forced self-reliance, then the support 
offered to refugees in Scotland should be emulated across the UK, to confront the inequalities of the 
current system. Alternatively, providing the Scottish Parliament with greater jurisdiction concerning 
the welfare and settlement of those forcibly displaced would bring clear benefits for those settled in 
Scotland. 
                                            
16 Whilst as far we are aware, this is the best data available for comparing the experience of refugees in England and Scotland, 
findings from such fine grained comparison should be interpreted with caution. A priori interregional heterogeneity in the 
experiences of refugees is likely to be substantial, given differences in economic and social contexts and the distribution of 
refugee and migrant populations. This view is reinforced by our findings. Therefore, it is important that future research 
addresses these issues in more detail by carrying out further analyses that are explicitly designed to understand regional 
heterogeneity, both between the home nations and also within England, which is internally diverse. 
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Conclusion: Building common ground 
Findings from the face to face interviews with young Syrian refugees paint an overall positive picture 
about their reception and settlement in the United Kingdom, compared to others who have found 
refuge in Lebanon or Greece. Forcibly displaced young Syrians in the UK receive better support, suffer 
less overt discrimination and seem to settle better than those, with a similar demographic background, 
in other countries. In interpreting these results, it should be taken into account that the worse 
economic conditions, weaker political structures and significantly higher numbers of forcibly displaced 
people in Lebanon and Greece pose many additional and disproportionate challenges to the authorities 
there. Overall though, the British government, and all key stakeholders at various levels, should be 
commended for implementing measures, many of which are closely aligned with the reported needs 
and aspirations of young Syrian refugees.  
Still, the analysis here has identified areas in the current practice in the UK where there is scope, and, 
indeed, urgent need for policy improvements. Our recommendations in this report are designed to 
facilitate better training and skills provision for young refugees, which would enhance their prospects 
of not only accessing the labour market and overcoming existing obstacles, but also of doing so in line 
with their own aspirations, skills and qualifications. This is also important for social integration. 
Our research also draws some broader conclusions. Comparisons both across the three countries 
studied and between sub-groups of forcibly displaced Syrians in the UK, reveal an obvious but crucial 
point: refugees that are supported better, settle better in the host state. At the cross-national level, 
this is reflected in their reported emotions about their current situation, but also in the ways they 
imagine and build their futures. Three out of four young Syrians intend to remain in the UK, compared 
to just 12% for those in Greece and 39% for those in Lebanon (Figure 18). The aim of most young 
Syrians in Greece at the time of the survey was to reach another European country (75%), Germany 
in particular, an option that now appears unlikely after the EU-Turkey deal and the closure of the 
central European route. Far fewer have a similar ambition among those who are in Lebanon (13%), 
with the limited support and more adverse conditions there leading over a third (37%) to express a 
preference for returning to Syria, despite the ongoing conflict.  
 
Figure 18: Future intentions of young Syrians in Lebanon, Greece and the UK 
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The same pattern is observed within sub-groups in the UK. One of the most striking findings is the 
difference in the levels of support offered to refugees based on their mode of entry to the UK, through 
the asylum or resettlement route, as well as on their location, in England or Scotland. For one, this 
seems to have a direct impact on future intentions. Resettled refugees are more like to see their future 
in the UK compared to those that applied for asylum upon arrival (83% and 70% respectively). Refugees 
in Scotland are more likely to want to remain there compared to those in England (81% vis a vis 65%). 
Practices that empower and support refugees are therefore paramount, if the intention of policy is 
settlement and integration.  
What’s more, the current system produces inequalities which are legally questionable and morally 
unsustainable. The UK is signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which commits its parties to 
granting international protection to persons with well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. A system that creates 
multiple and arbitrary tiers of support not only undermines its effectiveness but also potentially clashes 
with the country’s international legal obligations. This disjuncture is greater in England compared to 
Scotland and for those coming through the asylum route compared to refugees resettled through the 
VPRS. 
On a more pragmatic note, if the goal is to foster social cohesion, alleviate social tensions and generate 
more public acceptance of refugees in the British society, our findings can help policy-makers in the 
UK to frame and advocate policies which highlight refugees’ deservingness and vulnerability, their 
economic contributions to their host society, as well as the considerable common ground that they 
share with UK citizens concerning both needs and underlying ethical perspectives.  
The citizens’ perspectives, drawing on representative surveys of the host populations in Lebanon, 
Greece and the UK, are the focus of our second, forthcoming report. Synthesising evidence from the 
refugees and citizens surveys offers the exciting opportunity to steer public discourse in a way that 
promotes social cohesion and welfare for both groups. As discussed here, many of the obstacles to 
labour market participation faced by refugees are shared with citizens. Findings also dispel many of the 
persistent myths among British citizens about why refugees flee their country and what contributions 
they are able and eager to make in the UK. Indeed, our evidence from the citizens survey suggest that 
British people have a strong preference for highly skilled migrants and this preference is broadly met 
by the characteristics of Syrian refugees in the UK, as discussed here. Similarly, we find that there is 
common ground between Syrian refugees and UK citizens concerning what matters for a good life, 
which counters myths about ‘incompatible values’ between the two populations. A central challenge is 
to communicate this alignment, a key focus of our next report. Refugees’ training and skills needs can 
and should be met, and met in a more supportive social context. And members of host populations 
can be reassured that the principles governing the distribution of scarce resources are ones which 
resonate with underlying preferences, needs and ethical perspectives that both groups share. 
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Messages from young Syrian refugees to British citizens 
As part of our fieldwork, we asked young Syrian refugees in the UK to send a message to British citizens, which 
best captures how they would like to be seen and treated in the UK. These are some of the things they told us:  
 "Tolerance and acceptance of the ‘Other’ needs courage and compassion, two traits British citizens have often 
shown. Therefore, please give Syrians the helping hand in their time of need." 
 "I could be a valuable member of society if I was given the chance." 
 "Thank you for accepting us into the British society. I hope I can add a positive touch to this country." 
 “We are here because we couldn't tolerate the situation in Syria anymore. Please help us to build a decent and 
peaceful life.” 
  “Help me find a job. I have two masters with distinction, I am a previous champion in swimming, I won one of 
the most competitive scholarship in the world, and I am a community developer and a public speaker. It is 
shameful not to be able to find a job”. 
 “I would like to thank you for being so helpful towards the Syrian refugees.” 
  “We came here to work not to take your money. We just want to have a decent life.” 
 “I am a human just like you, treat me with respect and give me the opportunity to rebuild my life.” 
  “Try to know more about us and about our country because we are not what you think we are.” 
 “We lost our chance to continue our education back home. We lost everything so please help us to start over.”  
 “I'd only like to thank the British people for their kindness. There is nothing else to say.”  
 “I just want to ask the British people not to misjudge us because of what they hear on the media.” 
 “Put yourself in our shoes.” 
  “Please treat me as one of you and not as someone who came here just to deprive you of your rights.”  
 “I would like to thank you and tell you that I appreciate all your help and what you grant us as refugees.” 
  “We came here with our own aspirations. We have the skills/ 
education needed to start a new life and to help further 
improve this country so we are just asking you to have faith 
in us, in our abilities, and good intentions.” 
  “Give us a chance to show you our skills and to prove that we 
deserve a chance to start a decent, peaceful life.” 
 "There is nothing to say as I know my words will not be heard 
by anyone."  
#RefugeePolitics 
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